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The Dismissal of Tenured Faculty for Reasons
of Financial Exigency
Recent adverse economic conditions have forced colleges and uni-
versities to fire tenured faculty members for reasons of financial exi-
gency. The authority to terminate tenured faculty because of economic
hardships aids the college administrator in maintaining fiscal stability
but also offers a possible pretext for dismissal stemming from conduct
which would otherwise be protected by the institution's tenure provi-
sions.' Therefore, it is imperative that courts dealing with this prob-
lem arrive at a definition of "financial exigency" which will prevent
such abuse without handcuffing the administration in its attempts to
deal with economic crisis. This note seeks to develop a workable defini-
tion of "financial exigency" which will maximize an institution's ability
to respond to genuine financial stress without endangering the academic
fredom2 which tenure plans3 seek to foster.
1 AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 268, 322 A.2d 846, 856 (Ch. 1.974);
AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, -, 346 A.2d 615, 618 (App. Div. 1975)
(upholding the trial court's finding of bad faith).
2 Tenure provides continuing appointment for college faculty until retirement, subject
to removal for cause. The primary purpose of tenure is to safeguard academic freedom.
See B. SITHrr, THE TENuRE DEBATE 200 (1973). The right to pursue new or unpopular
ideas is the essence of academic freedom. See Jones, The American Concept of Academic
Freedom, in AcADEmxc FREEDOM AND TENuRE 231 (L. Joughin ed. 1969).
Tenure is designed to secure academic freedom by giving the faculty member sufficient
job security to remove any fear of sanctions by colleagues or pressure groups in society.
See Malchup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, id. at 177-78;
Pettigrew, "Constitutional Tenure." Toward a Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 475 (1971). The American Association of University Professors describes
tenure as "a means to certain ends, specifically (1) freedom of teaching and research and
of extramural activities and (2) a sufficient degree of economic security to make the pro-
fession attractive to men and women of ability." Academic Freedom and Tenure: Basic
Statements, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra, at 34-35.
3 A vast majority of public and private colleges in the United States have established
some type of tenure plan. See C. BysE & L. JOuGHIN, TENuRE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDU-
CATION 132 (1959); Matheson, Judicial Enforcement of Academic Tenure: An Examination,
50 WASH. L. REv. 597, 598 (1975). While these plans vary greatly, they generally provide
for a method of attaining tenure, the grounds for dismissal of tenured faculty, and pro-
cedural safeguards to be followed in the event of dismissal. C. BysE, & L. JOUGHIN, supra,
at 62-68.
Prior to receiving tenure status, faculty members serve a probationary period of three
to seven years in which they are evaluated for retention and promotion. Id. at 9-10. The
criteria for the acquisition of tenure include some or all of the following: research abilities,
teaching, publication, advanced degrees, service to the university, and advising skills. Id.
at 28-34.
While non-tenured faculty may ordinarily be terminated without special justification at
the end of their contract term, universities give up their normal power to dismiss tenured
faculty. Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323, 1328 (10th. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991
(1970). The power to dismiss is usually limited to termination for cause, which includes
moral turpitude, criminal conviction, disability, or professional incompetence. See B. SHAw,
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FINANCIAL EXIGENCY AND TENURE
The tenure plans of many colleges and universities embody various
provisions whcih grant their administrations the authority to terminate
the contracts of tenured faculty members for reasons of financial exi-
gency.4 At private institutions the tenure relationship is governed by
the terms of the employment contract.5 Some contracts delineate specific
situations, such as reduced income or lack of demand for courses, which
allow termination;6 others7 simply state that a bona fide financial exi-
gency may be a proper ground for dismissal.'
ACADEMIC TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, 62-65 (1971). Tenure provisions often
include procedural standards to be followed in the event of dismissal, including adequate
notice, formal hearings, legal advice, confrontation of witnesses, and appeal. C. BYSE &
L. JOUGHIN, supra, 60-64, 68.
See also J. BRUBACHER, THE COURTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (1971); M. CHAMBERS,
THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS (1973); M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS
SINCE 1950 (1964); R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); Fuchs, Academic Freedon--Its Basic Philosophy, Func-
tion and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431 (1963); Perkins, Developments in the Law
of Academic Freedom 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
4 See B. SHAW, ACADEMIC TENURE IN AmERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 62-65 (1971).
5 Tenure plans may be an explicit part of the contract terms. However, courts have
held that tenure provisions form a part of employment contracts even where they are not
specifically mentioned. See, e.g., Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 483 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App.
1971); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (university's disclaimer of
contractual obligation was ignored by the court).
6 C. BYSE & L. JOuGHIN, supra note 3, at 49.
7 Id. at 50.
8 Some tenure plans may not include financial exigency as a criterion for dismissal. In
the absence of explicit authority, courts may look to the practices and customs of these
universities to determine the extent of the institution's power to dismiss. See Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Cases of dismissal for financial exigency might also arise in a university without a
formal tenure plan. In their study of tenure system at 80 colleges and universities Byse
and Joughin reported that 14 of those schools recognizing tenure failed to spell out its in-
cidents in a formal document. C. BYSE & L. JOUGHIN, supra note 3, at 77 n.10. These
authors suggest that "the absence of a full, written plan may . . . result from a conviction
that custom and tradition, sometimes referred to as the common law of academic affairs,
are preferable to written regulations." Id. at 135. See Browzin v. Catholic University of
America, Civil No. 74-1474, at 9 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 1975); Finkin, Toward A Law of Aca-
demic Status, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 575 (1973).
In cases involving these informal tenure plans, the courts could apply the American
Association of University Professor's policies on academic tenure.
Paramount among these is the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure drafted jointly with the Association of American Colleges and currently
endorsed by more than 90 educational institutions and disciplinary societies, and
the Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
which set forth regulations, deriving from the principle provisions and interpreta-
tions of the 1940 Statement, suitable for immediate implementation by institutions
of higher education.
Brief for the American Association of University Professors as Amicus Curiae at 2, Browzin
v. Catholic University of America, Civil No. 74-1474 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 1975).
The AAUP has suggested regulations for dismissal which recognize termination for
financial exigency. Regulation 4(c) provides:
Termination for an appointment with continuous tenure, or of a probationary or
special appointment before the end of the special term, may occur under extraor-
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While most public colleges and universities have tenure systems,
only one state has a statute providing tenure for its statewide university
system.9 In other public institutions, governing boards may promulgate
tenure plans, which have the force of statutory law because of the quasi-
legislative nature of these boards.1" If such plans fail to provide ex-
plicitly for dismissal based on financial exigency, the extent of the insti-
tutions authority to dismiss depends on judicial interpretation of the
legislative intent of such terms as "for cause upon written charges"'"
or "when the interests of the university shall require it."' 2 The small
amount of case law on this point seems to indicate that financial exigency
is clearly subsumed within these terms.'3
dinary circumstances because of a demonstrably bona fide financial exigency which
cannot be alleviated by less drastic means.
58 AAUP BuLL. 428-33 (1972).
Because so many schools have adopted the AAUP's regulation on financial exigency, the
courts could look to these AAUP's guidelines in giving content to academic "common law."
See also Perry v. Sindermaun, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (referring to the possible existence
of a "common law" of a particular university); Finkin, Toward a Law of Academic Status,
22 BuFALo L. REv. 575 (1973). These guidelines would also be appropriate in giving direc-
tions in cases such as Perry where the existence of tenure is implied by the court.
9 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.13 (West Supp. 1975).
10 State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 180 Mont. 547, 556, 92 P.2d 306, 310 (1939); State
ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 150, 261 P.2d 515, 518 (1953) ; C. BYSE
& L. JOUGMN, supra note 3, at 72; Perkins, Developments in the Law of Academic Free-
dom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1100 (1968). Cf. Worzella v. Board of Regents, 77 S.D. 447,
93 N.W.2d 411 (1958), which held that the granting of tenure rights which restricted the
Board's power of dismissal constituted an unlawful abdication of power by the Board.
11 Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 231 (W.D. Wisc. 1974).
12 REV. STAT. NEB. § 85-106(7) (Reissue 1971). This statute is found in the section
dealing with state universities and is not included in the section dealing with state colleges.
However, the court in Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 952 (Neb. 1974) em-
ploys language similar to that of this statute in its findings of fact.
13 In Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wisc. 1974), tenured fac-
ulty who were terminated in response to financial exigency and declining student enrollment
sought a preliminary injunction to require the Board of Regents to continue their employ-
ment. Id. at 230. The statute under which these faculty members were dismissed did not
refer specifically to financial exigencies but provided: "No teacher who has become per-
manentiy employed . . . shall be discharged except for cause upon written charges." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 37.31(1) (West 1966). The court resolved the case without being required
to interpret the statute, but the judge expressed the opinion in dicta that the Wisconsin
courts should hold that the colleges have the power to dismiss faculty because of financial
exigency. 377 F. Supp. at 234-35.
A number of courts have held that local school boards have the power to dismiss tenured
faculty for reasons of financial exigency despite the absence of express statutory provisions.
Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1141, 1159-62 (1965); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 1410, 1418 (1929). The fact
that courts often cite high school tenure cases as authority in cases involving college tenure
indicates these cases on exigency may be viewed as appropriate precedent where statutory
interpretation is required.
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FINANCIAL EXIGENCY AS A GROUND FOR TERMINATION
OF TENURED FACULTY
Courts faced with the dismissal of a faculty member for reasons
of financial exigency must determine in each case (1) whether a finan-
cial exigency exists and (2) whether the dismissal represented a good
faith effort to alleviate that exigency.14 In addition courts will also
be faced with the allocation of the burden of proof on each of the
questions.15
What Constitutes Financial Exigency?
Establishing a clearcut test for the existence of financial exigency
is impractical because the finances of each college and university will
present a unique factual situation to the courts. For example, a loss in
gifts from private sources may have no measurable impact on a state
supported institution, while it could cause critical difficulties for a small,
private college. Nevertheless, the few cases dealing with the dismissal
of tenured faculty for financial exigency provide some guidance in as-
certaining the relevant considerations.
In Lumpert v. University of Dubuque,-6 plaintiff, a tenured faculty
member, had been dismissed under a contractual provision which stated
that:
After the expiration of the probationary period continuous appoint-
ment shall be established and services are to be terminated only for
adequate cause. It is understood that continuous appointment is based
upon the need for the services of the appointee and the financial abil-
ity of the institution to continue the appointment. 17
The court in its instructions to the jury defined "financial ability" and
"financial exigency" as follows:
"Financial ability" as used herein, means the ability to provide from
current income, both cash and accrued, the funds necessary to meet
current expenses including current debt payment and sound reserves,
without invading or depleting capital.
"Financial exigency" means an urgent need to reorder the nature and
magnitude of financial obligations in such a way as to restore or pre-
serve the financial ability of the institution .... 18
14 See AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 267, 322 A.2d 846, 855 (Ch.
1974).
15 AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, -, 346 A.2d 615, 616-17 (App.
Div. 1975).
16 Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, Civil No. 39973 (Dist. Ct. Iowa, July 15, 1974).
17 Brief for Defendant at 6, Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, Civil No. 39973 (Dist.
Ct. Iowa, July 15, 1974).
18 1d. at 2. The court's jury instructions indicate that it believed a lack of financial
ability constituted exigent circumstances.
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Despite evidence of a $100,000 current operating deficit, the jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff. 9 The court, however, sustained de-
fendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In addition
to the university's accounting records as evidence of exigency, the court
emphasized that the trend shown by the books had convinced the uni-
versity's creditors that failure to retrench would be negligent."
The most recent case dealing with this issue is American Associa-
tion of University Professors v. Bloomfield College." Bloomfield, a
small sectarian commuter college, had a tenure plan which provided
that after seven years
* . .a teacher will have tenure and his services may be terminated
only for adequate cause, except in case of retirement for age, or under
extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigency of the in
stitution....
Termination of continuous appointment because of financial exi-
gency of the institution must be demonstrably bona fide. A situation
which makes drastic retrenchment of this sort necessary precludes ex-
pansion of the staff at other points at the same time, except in extraor-
dinary circumstances.22
Under the authority of these regulations, the Board of Trustees termi-
nated eleven tenured faculty members for reasons of financial exigency.
At the same time, all other faculty members were placed on one-year
terminal contracts, thus effectively ending the tenure system. The fac-
ulty brought an action for declaratory relief and specific performance23
19 Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, Civil No. 39973, at 2 (Dist. Ct. Iowa, July
15, 1974).
20 Id. at 1.
21 AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Ch. 1974).
22 Id. at 253, 322 A.2d at 848.
23 The request for specific performance raises a side issue. The successful protection of
academic freedom through tenure plans ultimately depends on the ability of the faculty
member to enforce his tenure rights in the courts. In public institutions the discharge of a
faculty member in violation of statutory provisions can be remedied by an order to re-
instate the teacher since any such discharge would be beyond the authority of the govern-
ing board and a violation of state law.
The tenure rights of faculty at private universities are secured to some degree by con-
tract. The remedy for breach of contract, however, is limited by the principle that courts
will not decree specific performance of personal service contracts. A faculty member dis-
missed from a tenured position will not in most cases be able to gain reinstatement.
An exception was made in the Bloomfield case, where the court ordered the university
to return certain tenured faculty to their positions within the university. The court ordered
specific performance of the teachers' contracts on the grounds that New Jersey had repudi-
ated the doctrine of mutuality of remedy and that service of a seven year probationary
period constituted full performance of the contract by the faculty. By its action the court
elevated the degree of protection afforded tenured faculty at private institutions to that
enjoyed at public colleges and universities where faculty have a right to reinstatement when
university officials violate statutory provisions. The grant of specific performance in cases
of dimissal for reason of financial exigency should be the rule rather than the exception.
19761
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claiming that the administration's actions were not "'demonstrably bona
fide' as having been taken 'under extraordinary circumstances because
of the financial exigency of the institution'. 24
Although Bloomfield College's assets exceeded its liabilities because
of its ownership of a 322-acre tract of land, the enrollment figures and
financial circumstances indicated that the college was experiencing seri-
ous problems. Annual cash deficits at the college were well over $100,000
for 1972, 1973, and 1974.25 In 1973-74, the college's enrollment was
867, down from 1,069 in 1972,2" a serious decline for a college gaining
three-fourths of its financial support from tuition. In addition to these
problems, the college also had a liquidity problem. As was the case in
Lumpert, the magnitude of the college's financial difficulties seriously
affected its credit, causing its creditors to lend, on a week-to-week basis,
only what was necessary to meet payrolls. 27
Despite all these problems, the trial court declared:
Unless we are prepared to say that financial exigency is chronic at
Bloomfield College, it is difficult to say how, by any reasonable defini-
tion, the circumstances can now be pronounced exigent.28
The court based this decision largely on the existence of alternatives to
the dismissal of tenured faculty which would be equally effective in bal-
ancing the budget.2"
While it is obvious that exploration of alternative methods of budget
reduction is an important consideration in determining the existence of
a financial exigency, courts should not require the exhaustion of every
other alternative before tenured faculty can be released. Such a read-
ing of the term would effectively negate the power to dismiss tenured
In cases where faculty have been dismissed because of exigent circumstances there is no
assertion by college officials that the particular faculty member is incompetent or otherwise
unsuited to perform his functions. A request for specific performance does not, therefore,
ask equity to enforce an undesirable personal relationship. A second important reason to
allow specific performance is that damages would be very difficult to establish and could
not compensate a tenured faculty member for the disruption of his professional career, espe-
cially in light of the fact that a new position at another institution will be as a non-
tenured faculty member. Failure to grant specific performance under these circumstances
undermines the value of tenure and may have a chilling effect on the exercise of academic
freedom. See Finkin, Toward A Law of Academic Status, 22 BuPFAro L. Rtv. 575, 600
(1973).
24 129 N.J. Super. at 256, 322 A.2d at 849.
25 Id. at 257, 322 A.2d at 850.
261d. at 255, 322 A.2d 849.
2 7 ld. at 258, 322 A.2d at 851.
28 Id. at 270, 322 A.2d at 857.
29 Id. at 259, 270-71, 322 A.2d at 851, 857. Bloomfield College owned a 322 acre tract
of land known as the Knoll, consisting of two golf courses, two clubhouses, a swimming
pool, and a few residences. The trial judge expressed the opinion that this property could
be sold to solve the college's cash flow problems.
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faculty because a court could generally find another avenue which might
have been explored. Under some circumstances, such an approach might
result in a fiscal policy which allows the retention of faculty while endan-
gering the long-term stability of the institution.
In light of the serious financial problems of the college,"0 combined
with a significant loss of enrollment, the court's conclusion that no exi-
gency existed was questionable. 3' Predictably, the appellate court ex-
pressed the opinion 2 in dicta that there was insufficient evidence to con-
tradict the existence of an exigency "in view of the admitted absence
of liquidity and cash flow," and suggested that the trial court's interpre-
tation of "exigency" was too narrow and that the phrase "a state of
urgency" constituted a more reasonable construction of the term.
33
It is important to note that neither Lumpert nor the Bloomfield
appellate decision reads "exigency" to mean a financial problem which
threatens bankruptcy or the imminent collapse of the institution. In-
stead, these cases focus on the ability of the college to meet current ex-
penses and reject any suggestion that capital assets must be invaded to
resolve cash flow problems. This is a particularly useful approach since
it allows an institution to resolve financial problems before they become
irreversible and places an emphasis on protecting long term stability.
However, it must be made clear that an exigency is more than a
temporary or minor shortage. The appellate court's use of the phrase
3 0 Bloomfield was eventually placed in receivorship under Chapter XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The president of the college made the following statement:
The implications of the [trial court's] decision have moved us from financial
exigency to bankruptcy. It increased our deficit by $200,000 [the cost of the fac-
ulty salaries] and that was enough to push us over. Without Chapter XI we would
have had to close this fall.
The Chronicle of Higher Education, August 19, 1974, at 2, col. 2.
31 A number of other cases involving dismissals for reasons of financial exigency have
reached the courts as a result of a due process challenge, thus avoiding any question of
what constitutes an exigency. In Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D.
Wis. 1974), and Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974), the exi-
gency, which was not contested by the plaintiffs, was a result of legislative budget cuts.
In the Johnson case, the budget cuts were 2.5%7 of the base budget for 1973-74 and an
additional 2.5% for 1974-75. The Levitt opinion gives no specifics with respect to the
extent of the budget reductions. Browzin v. Catholic University of America, Civil No.
74-1474 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 1975), and Paulsen v. St. Joseph's College, Civil No. C-344-73
(Cir. Ct., June 12, 1974) also involved financial exigency, but in Browzin the parties
stipulated that an exigency existed and in Pausen the court merely stated that it found
exigent circumstances. The fact that few plaintiffs have challenged the existence of an
exigency, and the apparent ease with which the courts have determined that an exi-
gency existed, indicate that courts are embracing an expansive meaning of the term. Indeed,
there is no indication in any of these cases that a university must be insolvent or facing
bankruptcy before its financial status is declared exigent.
32AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 42, -, 346 A.2d 615, 617 (App.
Div. 1975).
33AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 42, -, 346 A.2d 615, 617 (App.
Div. 1975).
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"state of urgency" in the Bloomfield case indicates that the fiscal prob-
lems must be of a serious nature. But more importantly, it signals the
court's awareness that the adoption of an overly expansive definition of
financial exigency in order to allow institutions to deal with economic
problems opens the door for the use of financial exigency as a pretext
for the dismissal of tenured faculty members for activities otherwise
protected by a tenure plan.34
While these cases help to clarify the meaning of exigency, the point
at which a cash flow problem is serious enough to become exigent is un-
clear. With respect to this point, the analysis of future cases might be
easier if they are divided into two broad categories. The first includes
those colleges which have experienced financial losses resulting from,
or occurring in conjunction with, a decline in enrollment. The second
category encompasses colleges with financial problems arising from a
loss of income or a reduction in the value of assets not accompanied
by enrollment decline.
In the first situation, where the institution is experiencing financial
losses from, or occurring in conjunction with, declining enrollment, the
degree of seriousness required to satisfy "exigency" should be smaller
than where enrollment is stable. A significant decline in enrollment
creates a surplus of teachers and it would be unreasonable to require a
university to retain faculty not needed to meet student course demand.
In light of these considerations, courts faced with such cases should
adopt an analysis similar to that developed in Lumpert. The court in
Lumpert found an exigency where expenses exceeded income35 without
requiring the administration to exhaust all alternatives to dismissal of
tenured faculty members, 6 thus allowing the college the needed flexi-
bility to deal with the twin threat of shrinking enrollment and revenues.
However, such a test must clearly be modified by the requirement that
expenditures which cannot be justified as necessary to the development
of a sound academic program may not be considered in evaluating the
institution's financial condition.
This mode of analysis recognizes the authority and expertise of
the college administrator yet provides reasonable limits within which
that authority can be exercised, in an attempt to maximize the ability
of the institution to respond to legitimate financial stress. Furthermore,
the increased possibility of abuse inherent in such an approach can be
34 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
35 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
36 Cf. AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Ch. 1974), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
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dealt with by the requirement that the institution must demonstrate that
its actions were in good faith."
In the second situation, where student enrollment remains fairly
stable yet the institution suffers financial reverses from the loss of other
income, the university must be required to explore other alternatives
before dismissing tenured faculty." Indeed, a definition of exigency
that allows the dismissal of tenured faculty only as a "last resort" seems
appropriate as long as capital is not depleted.3 9 In view of the variety
of alternative methods of budget reduction, termination of tenured fac-
ulty under these circumstances should engender close judicial scrutiny.
3 7 See text accompanying notes 40-48 infra.
38 Several alternatives are available to reduce expenditures in the short run, such as:
a freeze on all new hiring, filling vacancies and granting raises, non-renewal of non-tenured
faculty contracts, a reduction in summer session expenditures, or a cut back in areas not
directly related to the academic functions of the institution.
While these measures may solve immediate problems, long term solutions will be neces-
sary. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education has outlined the dimensions of the
financial crisis facing American colleges and universities and suggested the following long
range approaches:
(1) Reducing the number of students by (a) accelerating programs and (b) by
reducing the number of reluctant attenders. We believe that the former will reduce
operating costs by at least 10 and perhaps 15 percent, and capital costs, in the
1970s, by one-third.
(2) Making more effective use of resources in relation to the students in at-
tendance. We suggest particularly:
* Halting creation of any new Ph.D. training and federally supported research
in fewer institutions.
o Achieving minimum effective size for campuses now below such size; and for
departments within campuses, particularly at the graduate level.
* Moving toward year-round operation so that more students can move through
the same capital facilities.
* Cautiously raising the student-faculty ratio ....
" Reexamining the faculty teaching load.
" Improving management by better selection and training of middle manage-
ment, by giving more expert assistance to the college president, and by improving
the budgetary process.
* Creating more alternatives off campus through "open" universities; credit by
examination; and so forth-saving capital expenditures and increasing competition
with traditional approaches.
a Establishing consortia among institutions; and also merging some.
CAn-;HEo CoIniSsIoN ON HIGER EDUCATION, THE MoRE EFFECTE USE OF REsoUcEs
16-18 (1972).
8 9 The AAUP's 1925 Conference Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure advo-
cated the "last resort" approach in the following regulation:
Termination of permanent or long-term appointments because of financial exigencies
should be sought only as a last resort, after every effort has been made to meet the
need in other ways and to find for the teacher other employment in the institu-
tion. Situations which make drastic retrenchment of this sort necessary should pre-
clude expansions of the staff at other points at the same time, except in extraordi-
nary circumtances.
Quoted in Browzin v. Catholic University of America, Civil No. 74-1474 (D.C. Cir., Dec.
8, 1975).
In its 1968 regulations suPra, the AAUP dropped the term "last resort." Instead, dis-
missal was permissible where the exigency could not "be alleviated by less drastic means."
1976]
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Was the Dismissal Bona Fide?
In addition to an evaluation of the seriousness of the fiscal prob-
lems facing a particular college, the court must ascertain whether the
dismissal of faculty was in good faith. The court in Levitt v. Board of
Trustees of Nebraska State College stated in general terms the sig-
nificance of a finding that the administration acted in good faith:
Where there is a showing that the administrative body, in exercising
its judgment, acts from honest convictions, based upon facts which it
believes for the best interest of the school, and there is no showing
that the acts were arbitrary or generated by ill will, fraud, collusion
or other such motives it is not the province of a court to interfere
and substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body 40
The trial court in Bloom field conceded the college's financial status
was poor but ordered reinstatement of the faculty because the univer-
sity failed to demonstrate that its action was "in good faith related"'"
to a condition of financial exigency within the institution. A variety of
evidence was cited to support the court's finding: internal memoranda
written by Bloomfield's president that evidenced an anti-tenure motive,
placing the entire faculty on one-year terminal contracts when that action
did not alleviate the fiscal problems, failure to utilize remedial measures
such as across-the-board salary reductions, termination of non-tenured
faculty and sale of real estate holdings, hiring twelve new faculty with-
out adequate justification, and failure to seek faculty advice on new
program developments. 42 Although these facts are peculiar to the Bloom-
field case, they are indicative of evidence which might help ascertain good
faith in other cases.
58 AAUP BULL. 428-33 (1972). The revision may have resulted from a recognition that a
"last resort" approach might endanger the long term stability of the institution. The goal
of protecting long term stability can also be achieved by limiting the choice of alternatives
to those which do not deplete capital. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
40 Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (Neb. 1974).
41 AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 268, 322 A.2d 846, 856 (Ch. 1974).
The findings of the lower court with respect to good faith were sustained on appeal with-
out specific comment on the evidence supporting the decision. AAUP v. Bloomfield College,
136 N.J. Super. 42, -, 346 A.2d 615, 618 (App. Div. 1975).
42AAUP v. Bloomfield, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 268-72, 322 A.2d 846, 856-57 (Ch. 1974).
43 The American Association of Colleges has issued the following guidelines on pro-
gram curtailment which might serve as a standard against which to measure good faith in
cases of dismissal:
In situations where curtailment or elimination of educational programs may be
necessary for reasons of financial exigency the following guidelines may be useful:
1. Consultation. Early in the process of making recommendations or decisions
concerning program reduction, administrators and faculty policy groups should con-
sult widely with their colleagues, students, and others in the college community.
It is especially important that faculty members whose educational programs or
positions may be adversely affected have an opportunity to be heard by those who
will make the final decision or recommendation.
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Specifically the Bloomfield trial court stated that the failure of the
college to terminate non-tenure faculty first indicated a lack of good
faith. While this is a useful standard which can be applied in future
cases, the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education has
offered an important caveat:
Although there is general agreement that in staff reductions the in-
terests of the tenured faculty should normally predominate over the
interests of those who are on term appointments, sometimes the qual-
ity of the educational program may be seriously compromised if that
principle is automatically applied. Circumstances can be envisaged in
2. Data and Documentation. Every effort must be made to determine the
nature of the fiscal limitations and within those constraints to establish appropriate
educational priorities. Careful documentation of the evidence supporting a staff
reduction decision is essential. Appropriate financial information, student-faculty
ratios, qualitative program and course evaluations, enrollment data, and other per-
tinent information should be used to support a case of financial exigency. Except
for confidential material of a personal nature this information should be widely
shared among the college community.
3. Timing. Institutions should provide as much lead time as possible in mak-
ing financial exigency decisions. In cases where faculty appointments are to be
terminated timely notice of termination or nonreappointment must be given. In
extreme situations, if timely notice cannot be given, financial compensation to the
faculty member proportional to the lateness of the notice may be an appropriate
substitute for full notice.
4. Academic Due Process. When program reductions in response to financial
exigency involve termination of faculty appointments special care must be taken to
insure fairness and to protect and honor accepted procedures and rights appropriate
to a faculty member's tenured or probationary status. Faculty members must have
an opportunity to be heard by those who will make the staff reduction decisions
and those decisions must be subject to review by the highest institutional authority.
Care should be taken not to confuse termination because of financial exigency with
a proceeding that might lead to dismissal for cause.
5. Elimination of a Faculty Position. If an appointment is terminated before
the end of the period of appointment, because of financial exigency, or because of
the discontinuance of a program of instruction, the released faculty member's place
will not be filled by a replacement within a period of two years, unless the released
faculty member has been offered reappointment and a reasonable time within which
to accept or decline it.
6. Preferential Treatment. Tenured members of the faculty should normally
be retained in preference to probationary appointees. This preferential status should
include wherever possible an opportunity to transfer or readapt to other programs
within the department or institution. If retention is not possible the institution
should assume responsibility for assisting the faculty member in securing other em-
ployment. Preferential retention of tenured faculty should not, however, leave a
reduced academic unit in the highly undesirable situation of lacking any proba-
tionary faculty. In some cases, tenured and probationary faculty may both have
to be reduced.
7. Alternatives. Early retirement and transfer from full-time to part-time serv-
ice may be acceptable alternatives to termination in some situations of financial
exigency. However, such decisions should be governed by the same guidelines and
procedural safeguards as those which result in termination.
AssocrATioN OF A2A.amcAN COLLEGES, Statement on Financial Exigency and Staff Reduction
(November 8, 1971).
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which it may be necessary to terminate a tenure appointment rather
than a non-tenured one. 44
The American Association of University Professors supports this posi-
tion in its statement concerning operating guidelines for institutions
with financial problems, recommending that the retention of a viable
academic program is the highest priority when budget reductions are
required.45
The Bloomfield court also argued that an institution cannot estab-
lish good faith unless faculty members are involved in the evaluation
of any program changes. 46 The history of faculty participation in aca-
demic decisionmaking in American higher education suggests this would
also be a useful criterion in evaluating bona fides.
Finally the court stated that only extraordinary circumstances can
justify expansion of staff during periods of financial stringency. Here
again the court announces a principle which can be applied generally
but is not without exceptions. It is possible to envision increasing en-
rollment pressure on a particularly popular program which might justify
hiring new faculty if those being dismissed lacked the necessary exper-
tise to fill the positions available. If such extraordinary circumstances
did arise, the university should be required to attempt to place the af-
fected faculty members in other suitable positions within the university
in order to establish good faith.4 8
4 4 COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE 87
(1973).
45 AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports 43 (1973).4 6 AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 270, 322 A.2d 846, 857 (Ch. 1974).
47 See, e.g., J. CORSON, GOVERNANCE OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1960); H. MASON,
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENT (1972).
48 A large number of colleges and universities have adopted the AAUP guidelines on
tenure as part of their employment contracts. See note 8 supra. AAUP regulation 4(c)
provides in part:
Where termination of appointment is based upon financial exigency, or bona fide
discontinuance of a program or department of instruction, Regulation 5 [dealing
with dismissals for cause] will not apply .... In every case of financial exigency
or discontinuance of a program or department of instruction, the faculty member
concerned will be given notice as soon as possible, and never less than 12 months'
notice, or in lieu thereof he will be given severance salary for 12 months. Before
terminating an appointment because of the abandonment of a program or depart-
ment of instruction, the institution will make every effort to place affected faculty
members in other suitable positions. If an appointment is terminated before the
end of the period of appointment, because of financial exigency, or because of the
discontinuance of a program of instruction, the released faculty member's place will
not be filled by a replacement within a period of two years, unless the released
faculty member has been offered reappointment and a reasonable time within which
to accept or decline it.
54 AAUP BULL. 448, 449 (1968).
Whether or not the "suitable position" requirement applied to cases of financial exigency
was litigated in Browzin v. Catholic University, Civil No. 74-1474 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 1975).
The university had dismissed Browzin for reasons of financial exigency and within a two
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A basic consideration underlying the inquiry into good faith is
whether the reduction in the number of faculty was reasonably calcu-
lated to relieve the exigency. If staff reduction will have little or no
effect on the institution's financial problems, the university may not be
acting in good faith. Therefore, the administration must be able to show
that it has developed a comprehensive plan to reorder financial obliga-
tions and reduce expenditures and that the elimination of some staff
positions will contribute to that goal.
If challenged, the determination of the bona fides of a particular
administrative action will necessarily depend on a case-by-case analysis.
The requirement that dismissals for financial exigency must be done
in good faith is nevertheless necessary to the protection of academic
freedom.
Who Should Bear the Burden of Proof?
Because the concepts of bona fides and financial exigency escape
concrete measure, the allocation of the burden of proof in a given case
will be important. In an attempt to allocate the burden of proof, the
court in the Levitt case adopted the standard of review normally ap-
plied to the decisions of administrative agencies.49  According to this
test, an administrative agency's decision is entitled to a presumption of
correctness and will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing
that such decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, and the
agency's factual determinations must be accepted if supported by sub-
stantial, credible evidence.5 Under this standard the faculty member
would be required to show either that the college had acted in bad faith
or that no condition of exigency existed.
The trial court in Bloonmfield also stated that it would apply an
administrative review standard "[e]xcept for policy differences touch-
ing upon the presumption of correctness and burden of proof ....
year period had filled new positions for which the plaintiff felt he was qualified. The lower
court held that the "suitable position" rule did not apply to cases of financial exigency.
The appeals court avoided the question by finding that the "suitable position" rule applied
to discontinuation of a program of instruction. Since Catholic University chose to meet its
financial exigency by terminating Browzin's program, the court held it must attempt to
find a suitable position for him. The dismissal of the case was upheld on the grounds that
the plaintiff failed to show that the university had not attempted to find a suitable posi-
tion for him.
This leaves open the question of whether the "suitable position" rule applies to finan-
cial exigency. While the literal language appears to exempt exigency from the rule, reading
the rule as a whole would suggest that it does apply and could be used as a measure of
good faith.
49Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (Neb. 1974).
GO See K. DAvis, An umIsvRA LAW TEXT §§ 29.01-.02 (3d ed. 1972).
G1 AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 267, 322 A.2d 845, 855 (Ch. 1974).
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The defendant Bloomfield College was therefore required to prove that
an exigency motivated the dismissal of the tenured faculty. Although
these two courts purported to apply the same standard of review, they
allocated the burden of proof to opposite parties.
The major advantage offered by the administrative review stan-
dard is that courts are familiar with its application from cases involv-
ing review of administrative agency decisions. The standard prevents
de novo consideration by the courts, thus giving weight to the exper-
tise of administrators and avoiding duplication of their efforts by the
courts. Moreover, because the test does not provide rigid guidelines,
courts would have some flexibility in the manner in which it is applied.
However, despite these advantages this standard does not seem ap-
propriate when applied to a party directly involved in a contract dis-
pute. The standard was developed for use in reviewing the decisions
of supposedly independent agencies. Under the circumstances of these
dismissal cases, a college board cannot be compared to an independent,
objective factfinder whose decisions are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. The Bloomfield court was apparently sensitive to these dif-
ferences when it required Bloomfield College to affirmatively prove the
existence of a financial exigency.52
Corbin suggests that a party who relies on the existence of a factor
to discharge a contractual obligation should bear the burden of proof
on that issue.5" In these cases financial exigency, if proven, excuses the
college from the performance of its contract duties, and thus the col-
lege should be required to establish an exigency. Placing this burden
on the university officials seems reasonable in light of their ready access
to and understanding of budget statements. Almost certainly, the uni-
versity's budget officials will have already documented the financial prob-
lems for administrative purposes and could easily adapt such data for
use in litigation. Conversely, it would be difficult for the faculty mem-
ber to disprove an exigency without extensive and expensive pre-trial
discovery."4
The college should not however also be required to show that its
actions were in good faith. Because of the difficulty involved in negat-
ing charges of arbitrariness, it should be sufficient for the college to
establish its prima facie case by showing that a financial exigency existed.
The faculty member should then have the affirmative duty to show arbi-
52Id. at 268, 322 A.2d at 856.
53 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTR\CTS § 1228 (1964).
54 "The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden
upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary."
United States v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957).
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trary or capricious motive, according to the normal requirement that
plaintiff assumes the burden of persuasion and production of evidence."
CONCLUSION
In developing a definition of financial exigency, courts must bal-
ance the ability of educational institutions to cope with financial crises
against the need to protect faculty from arbitrary dismissal. While the
financial circumstances of each institution will present a new set of facts,
these cases can be divided into two broad categories for purposes of
analysis. The first would include schools suffering from a decline in
enrollment as well as a loss of funds and the second would consist of
schools where enrollment remains stable despite a fiscal crisis.
In the first group of cases, recovery may require a thorough re-
ordering of priorities as well as a reevaluation of program offerings.
An expansive definition of exigency is appropriate in these cases in
order to maximize the ability of the college to avert financial collapse.
A narrower definition of exigency is appropriate where enrollment is
stable. Under these circumstances the immediate future of the institu-
tion would appear more secure and the college should be expected to
dismiss faculty only as a "last resort."
Whether a given case calls for a broad or narrow definition of
"exigency," the protection of academic freedom requires that the dis-
missal of any tenured faculty member in fact be related to the exigency.
A requirement of good faith lessens the danger of an abuse of power,
especially in cases where enrollment loss gives the administrator greater
freedom of action.
Finally, courts must allocate the burden of persuasion as to the
existence of a financial exigency and of a good faith dismissal. In view
of the institution's reliance on the existence of a financial exigency as
grounds for dismissal and its possession of the records necessary to
prove such a condition, the institution should be required to prove that
65 See C. McCoR.mmcK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 786 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); 5 A.
CoRBiN, CoPBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1228 (1964). Cf. Browzin v. Catholic University of Amer-
ica, Civil No. 74-1474 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 8, 1975) where the court upheld the assignment of
the burden of proof to the plaintiff based on the failure of the plaintiff to raise objections at
trial. The issue in that case was not whether the dismissal was bona fide but whether the
university had attempted to place the dismissed faculty member in another suitable position
within the institution. The court, while indicating that the plaintiff normally has the burden
of proof on such an issue, nevertheless found "some merit" in the argument that the burden
should have been on the defendant.
Contra, AAUP v. Blomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 42, 346 A.2d 615 (App. Div. 1975).
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an exigency actually existed. However, if the institution meets this
burden, the faculty member should then be required to establish that he
was dismissed for reasons other than financial exigency.
JAMES L. PETERSEN
